Add avoid_docker_exploits.md
This commit is contained in:
parent
b5048cb736
commit
18089806fc
1 changed files with 71 additions and 0 deletions
71
avoid_docker_exploits.md
Normal file
71
avoid_docker_exploits.md
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
|||
● Given the exposed Docker API and high CPU usage, I strongly recommend starting with a fresh Linode. The privileged container access means attackers could have gained full system control.
|
||||
|
||||
Why fresh start is safer:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Persistent access: Attackers often install backdoors that survive container removal
|
||||
2. Rootkit detection: Sophisticated compromises are hard to fully detect and remove
|
||||
3. Time vs security: Rebuilding is faster than forensic analysis for production systems
|
||||
|
||||
If you must keep this instance:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Immediate isolation: Disconnect from network, change all credentials
|
||||
2. Full forensic analysis: Requires security expertise to ensure complete cleanup
|
||||
3. Higher risk: Potential for undetected persistence mechanisms
|
||||
|
||||
For a production CI system, the clean rebuild approach is more secure and time-efficient in the long run.
|
||||
|
||||
> What simple steps can I take in the future to make sure this won't happen even as I am setting up my podman containers and testing them?
|
||||
|
||||
● Critical Security Steps for Future Setup:
|
||||
|
||||
1. NEVER Expose Docker/Podman API Publicly
|
||||
# UNSAFE (what caused the issue):
|
||||
podman run -p 2375:2375 --privileged ...
|
||||
|
||||
# SECURE Alternatives:
|
||||
# Use UNIX socket (local only)
|
||||
podman run -v /var/run/podman.sock:/var/run/podman.sock
|
||||
|
||||
# Or use SSH tunnel for remote access
|
||||
ssh -L 2375:localhost:2375 user@host
|
||||
|
||||
2. Firewall First Approach
|
||||
# Block all incoming by default
|
||||
sudo ufw default deny incoming
|
||||
sudo ufw default allow outgoing
|
||||
|
||||
# Only open specific needed ports
|
||||
sudo ufw allow ssh
|
||||
sudo ufw allow 80,443 # web only if needed
|
||||
sudo ufw enable
|
||||
|
||||
3. Avoid Privileged Containers
|
||||
# Instead of --privileged, use specific capabilities:
|
||||
podman run --cap-add NET_ADMIN --cap-add SYS_ADMIN ...
|
||||
|
||||
# Or use security opts:
|
||||
podman run --security-opt=no-new-privileges ...
|
||||
|
||||
4. Test in Isolated Network
|
||||
# Create internal network
|
||||
podman network create ci-network
|
||||
|
||||
# Run containers on internal network only
|
||||
podman run --network ci-network ...
|
||||
|
||||
● 5. Monitoring During Setup
|
||||
# Watch CPU/memory during testing
|
||||
htop
|
||||
|
||||
# Monitor network connections
|
||||
sudo ss -tulpn
|
||||
|
||||
# Check container processes
|
||||
podman top <container>
|
||||
|
||||
6. Use Temporary Testing Environment
|
||||
- Test container configurations on local machine first
|
||||
- Use development Linode that can be easily rebuilt
|
||||
- Never expose testing containers to public internet
|
||||
|
||||
The key is: never expose container management APIs (Docker/Podman ports) to the internet, and always start with a deny-all firewall policy.
|
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue