159 lines
5.9 KiB
Markdown
159 lines
5.9 KiB
Markdown
# Proof of Open Individualism from the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Extended Modal Realism
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## Assumptions
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- **PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason)**: Every fact has a sufficient explanation.
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- **EMR (Extended Modal Realism)**: All possible, impossible, and incoherent worlds are real.
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- Conscious subjects exist in (some) worlds.
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- **Phenomenal indexicality**: Each conscious subject experiences their own perspective (what it's like to be "me").
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---
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## Step-by-Step Proof of Open Individualism
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### 1. Define the Subject of Experience
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Let a *subject of experience* be the entity for which there is *something it is like* to exist (Nagel 1974). This is often modeled as an **observer-moment**: an instantaneous state of phenomenal consciousness.
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Let the **set of all observer-moments** across all modalities be denoted:
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\( \mathcal{O} \)
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By EMR, \( \mathcal{O} \) contains every logically, illogically, metaphysically, and physically possible observer-moment.
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---
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### 2. Observer-Moment Identity
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Let \( o_1, o_2 \in \mathcal{O} \) be any two observer-moments. Assume for contradiction that they belong to *distinct* subjects of experience.
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This implies a distinction between subjects—say \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \)—where \( o_1 \in S_1 \), \( o_2 \in S_2 \).
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But such a distinction requires explanation under **PSR**:
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- Why does \( o_1 \) belong to \( S_1 \) and not \( S_2 \), and vice versa?
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---
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### 3. No Sufficient Reason for Subject Boundaries
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Per **EMR**, *every* way of carving up experience—including *no carving at all*—exists in some world. There are incoherent worlds with:
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- No subject boundaries,
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- Reversed or cyclic boundaries,
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- Infinitely fractal or inconsistent individuation.
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Therefore, **any particular boundary assignment is modally arbitrary**.
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By **PSR**, this arbitrariness is unacceptable:
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> There must be a sufficient reason for why *this* partitioning of observer-moments into subjects holds rather than another.
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But EMR ensures *every* partitioning exists. So no single partition can be ontologically privileged **without violating PSR**.
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---
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### 4. Eliminate Arbitrary Multiplicity
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To preserve PSR, we must **eliminate all arbitrary distinctions** between observer-moments.
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This leads to the only viable identity structure:
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> **Open Individualism (OI)**: All observer-moments are experienced by one and the same subject.
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All other identity theories (e.g., Closed Individualism or Empty Individualism) impose distinctions that:
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- Lack sufficient reason,
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- Conflict with EMR’s universal realization of partitionings,
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- Therefore **violate PSR**.
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---
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### 5. Objection: Why *One* and Not *Many*?
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OI is not privileging “one” per se. Rather:
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- It imposes **no boundaries**,
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- It is **identity-minimal**,
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- It **avoids arbitrary structure**.
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Hence, it is the only account compatible with **PSR + EMR**.
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Any multiplicity implies a modally unjustified subject individuation.
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---
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## ✅ Conclusion
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Given:
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- **PSR**: No arbitrary or unexplained facts,
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- **EMR**: All identity structures exist across worlds,
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- **OI**: The only non-arbitrary, non-partitioned account of experience,
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We conclude:
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> **Open Individualism is necessarily true**: there exists a single, modally unbounded subject who experiences every observer-moment.
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Any alternative view entails unexplained distinctions—thus violating the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
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------
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# Proof That Closed and Empty Individualism Cannot Be True Even Locally (Given PSR and EMR)
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## Premises
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### P1. Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
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Every fact or distinction must have a sufficient reason; no brute facts are allowed.
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### P2. Extended Modal Realism (EMR)
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All possible, impossible, and incoherent worlds exist. Nothing is excluded from existence.
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### P3. Global Open Individualism (GOI)
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There is only one subject of experience, numerically identical across all possible and impossible worlds.
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> GOI follows necessarily from P1 and P2 (as shown in prior proof), because:
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> - PSR forbids arbitrary metaphysical distinctions.
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> - EMR includes all worlds, persons, and configurations.
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> - Therefore, only one subject can exist without invoking brute identity constraints.
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---
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## Definitions
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- **Closed Individualism (CI)**: Each person is a numerically distinct subject who persists across time.
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- **Empty Individualism (EI)**: Each momentary experience belongs to a separate subject that vanishes immediately.
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- **Local Metaphysical Validity**: A theory is locally valid if it can be ontologically true within a single world.
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---
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## Goal
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To prove:
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**CI and EI cannot be metaphysically valid even within a single world**, given the truth of GOI.
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---
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## Proof
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### Step 1: GOI Posits a Global Subject
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From P3, there is exactly **one** experiencer across all centers of consciousness in all worlds.
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### Step 2: CI and EI Require Ontological Subject Distinctions
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- CI posits that each person is a **numerically separate** subject of experience.
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- EI posits that each momentary experience is **ontologically isolated**.
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Therefore, both CI and EI assert **real metaphysical distinctions** between subjects.
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### Step 3: Any Metaphysical Distinction Requires Sufficient Reason (From P1)
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Under PSR, **any metaphysical distinction** (e.g., between subjects) must be justified with a sufficient reason.
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### Step 4: No Such Sufficient Reason Exists in EMR
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In EMR (P2), **all configurations** of persons exist, and GOI (P3) treats them all as **perspectival variations** of the same subject.
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Therefore, asserting "this subject is not that one" introduces a brute distinction — which violates PSR (P1).
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### Step 5: CI and EI Are Metaphysically Invalid in All Worlds
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Since CI and EI depend on subject distinctions that cannot be justified under PSR + EMR, they are **never metaphysically valid** — not even within a single world.
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---
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## Conclusion
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> **∴ Closed Individualism and Empty Individualism are logically incompatible with PSR + EMR + GOI.**
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> They cannot be true, even locally in any individual world.
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